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EXPLAINING MARKET POWER DIFFERENCES IN BANKING: 
A CROSS-COUNTRY STUDY 
 





This paper presents evidence on the impact of bank-specific, regulatory, 
institutional, macro and financial development variables on competition in banking, 
using information at both national and bank level. With this aim, Lerner indices of 
market power are estimated using a sample of 10,479 annual observations over the 
period 1995-99 across 58 countries. Results show that although bank-specific 
characteristics explain a substantial proportion of market power, market structure 
variables and, above all, the level of financial development also help to explain the 
differences observed in the levels of banking competition. Regulatory impediments to 
competition are not significant when controlling for financial development. 
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Este artículo presenta evidencia del impacto que las variables específicas de cada 
banco, las regulatorias, institucionales, macroeconómicas y de desarrollo financiero 
ejercen sobre la competencia bancaria, utilizando información tanto a escala nacional 
como a nivel de empresa. Con este objetivo, se estiman índices de Lerner de poder de 
mercado utilizando 10.479 observaciones durante el periodo de 1995-99 para una 
muestra de 58 países. Los resultados muestran que, aunque las características 
específicas de cada banco explican una parte sustancial del poder de mercado 
(especialmente el tamaño y la eficiencia), las variables de estructura del mercado, y, 
sobretodo, el nivel de desarrollo financiero también ayudan a explicar las diferencias 
observadas en los niveles de competencia bancaria. Las barreras regulatorias a la 
competencia no son significativas cuando se controla por desarrollo financiero. 
Palabras clave: Banca, poder de mercado.   3
1.  Introduction 
The banking sector plays a fundamental role in the economy insofar as financial 
intermediaries channel savings into investment. The greater the efficiency achieved in 
the process of intermediation and the greater the competition among the intermediaries, 
the lower the cost of intermediation and, therefore, the greater the savings available to 
finance economic growth.  
There are several reasons that show that banking sector competition matters. 
Thus, the degree of banking competition can affect, a) the efficient management of 
banks (Berger and Hannan, 1998); b) the access of firms to external financing (see, for 
example, Beck et al. 2004); c) the stability of the financial system (see Allen and Gale, 
2004, for a review); and d) the economic growth (Cetorelli and Gamberra, 2001, and 
Claessens and Laeven, 2005, among others). From a social point of view, the existence 
of market power implies a net loss of social welfare. 
Conscious of the importance of the subject, a substantial number of studies 
analyse banking competition (see the recent survey by Berger et al. 2004). The first ones 
focussed on the effect of bank concentration on performance, testing the traditional 
structure-conduct-performance versus efficient structure hypothesis. To this end, bank 
concentration measures (such as the Herfindahl-Hirschamn or n-firm concentration 
ratios) were used as proxy variables for competition. The initial studies were expanded 
by including proxy variables for efficiency with the aim of testing the so-called efficient 
structure hypothesis (Berger, 1995). 
Since then the banking literature has analysed the evolution of the intensity of 
banking competition using diverse instruments of industrial organisation economics (the 
so-called “new empirical industrial organization” literature). More specifically, the 
published studies use optimisation models from which are derived indicators of 
competition such as the Lerner index, the Breshnahan mark-up test, the Panzar and Ross 
test (“H-statistic”), the estimation of conjectural variation parameters, etc.  
More recently, the researchers have expanded the study of competition by 
analysing the effect of the competitive environment (regulatory and institutional 
variables), using samples that contain countries with different levels of development. In 
particular, two recent studies stand out. Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2004) examine the impact   4
of bank-specific characteristics, bank regulations, market structure, and institutional 
development on bank net interest margins and overheads costs, using bank-level data 
across 72 countries, while Barth et al. (2004) examine the relationships between a broad 
array of bank regulations and supervisory practices and aggregate measures of bank 
development, performance and stability, using a cross-country database. 
Despite the abundance of literature existing on banking competition, there is a 
scarcity of studies analysing the explanatory factors of market power, especially for the 
specific case of cross-country studies. The only exception is the recent paper by 
Claessens and Laeven (2004), who apply the Panzar and Rosse methodology to estimate 
the degree of competition in the banking systems of 50 countries
1. This subject is 
especially relevant, as although it is important to know the degree of competition in the 
bank markets, from an economic policy point of view it is more important to identify 
the sources of market power. Only when the sources of market power are identified will 
it be possible to implement the necessary actions to reduce the social inefficiency 
associated with the existence of market power. 
In this context, the aim of this paper is to estimate a measure of competition for a 
large cross-section of countries and to find some factors helping explain differences. We 
specifically seek to analyze the role of bank-specific, market structure, regulatory, 
institutional, macro and financial development variables on bank market power across 
countries. To this aim, we use a panel data of 10,479 annual observations over the 
period 1995-99 covering 58 banking sectors. The sample used combines information at 
national and bank levels. One of the main novelties of the paper is that we use Lerner 
indices as indicators of market power, which allows us to analyse the effect of bank-
specific variables on banking competition using bank level information. 
We find that although bank-specific characteristics explain a substantial 
proportion of market power (especially size and efficiency), market structure variables 
and, above all, the level of financial development also help to explain the differences 
observed in the levels of banking competition. Regulatory impediments to competition 
are not significant when controlling for financial development. 
                                                 
1 Claessens and Laeven (2004) relate Panzar and Rosse´s test of competition to indicators of countries´ 
banking system structures and regulatory regimes.   5
The article is divided into 5 sections. After this introduction, section 2 presents 
the approach used for the measurement of market power in banking, and the empirical 
results for the 58 countries of the sample. Section 3 identifies the potential explanatory 
variables of market power in banking and its empirical approach. Based on regressions 
of market power on bank-specific, market structure, regulatory, institutional and 
financial variables, section 4 presents the results of the analysis of the explanatory 
factors of market power. Finally, section 5 concludes.  
2.  The measurement of market power in banking: empirical results 
2.1.  The Lerner index of market power 
The numerous studies of banking competition have used various instruments to 
measure market power. A possible classification of the instruments used allows us to 
classify them into two groups. In the first we find the instruments with solid theoretical 
foundations. This group includes instruments based on the new empirical industrial 
organization literature: the Lerner index (Prescott and McCall, 1975; Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara, 2004; Fernández de Guevara et al. 2005; Fernández de Guevara 
and Maudos, 2004), the Breshnahan mark-up test (Shaffer 1993; Shaffer and Disalvo, 
1994; Suominen, 1994), the Panzar and Rosse´s H-statistic (Molyneux et al., 1994;  De 
Bandt and Davis, 2000; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Shaffer, 2004; Claessens and Laeven 
2004); conduct parameter (Barros, 1999; Neven and Röller, 1999; Kim and Vale, 2001; 
Canhoto, 2004; Coccorese, 2004; Pinho, 2000) and Tobin´s q (Keeley, 1990). In the 
second group, we include measurements that are not based on any model of industrial 
organization, such as the so-called structure-conduct-performance paradigm vs. efficient 
structure hypothesis (Berger, 1995) as well as the use of measures of concentration as a 
proxy for market power.  
Among the instruments with solid theoretical foundations, in this paper we use 
Lerner indices to measure market power for two reasons: firstly, the Lerner index can be 
estimated for each bank in the sample; consequently, we can analyse the determinants of 
market power using information at firm level (bank-specific variables); and secondly, 
the evolution of market power can be analysed estimating a Lerner index for each year.  
The estimation of Lerner indices has been widely used in the banking sector as 
indicators of degrees of market power.  Some of the most important studies in this area   6
are Shaffer (1993) for Canadian banks, Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) for Italian banks, 
Maudos and Pérez (2001) for the Spanish banking sector, and Fernández de Guevara et 
al. (2005), Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) and Fernández de Guevara and 
Maudos (2004) for a sample of countries of the European Union. 
In the case of banking companies, the model most often used as a reference from 
which a Lerner index expression is obtained is the Monti-Klein imperfect competition 
model (see Freixas and Rochet, 1997). This model examines the behaviour of a 
monopolistic bank faced with a deposit supply curve of positive slope D(rD) and a loan 
demand curve of negative slope L(rL). The decision variables of the bank are D (volume 
of deposits) and L (volume of loans), and for simplicity's sake the level of capital is 
assumed to be given. The bank is assumed to be a price taker in the inter-bank market 
(r), so that the objective function of profits to be maximised is as follows: 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) D L C D D r r L r L r D L D L , ) , ( − − + − = Π = Π     (1) 
so that profit is the net interest income between deposits and loans, after deducting the 
transformation costs C(L,D). The first order conditions with respect to deposits and 
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     (2) 
εD and εL being the elasticities of demand for deposits and loans, respectively. 
The Lerner index for expression (2) represents the extent to which the 
monopolist's market power allows it to fix a price above marginal cost, expressed as 
proportional to the price. In the case of perfect competition, the value of the index is 
zero, there being no monopoly power. Starting from this extreme case, the lower the 
elasticity of demand, the greater the monopoly power to fix a price above the marginal 
cost. As Fernández de Guevara et al (2005) show, the relative margins, rather than the 
absolute margins, are the most appropriate for evaluating the evolution of competition, 
for two reasons. First, oligopoly competition models determine a relation of equilibrium 
between the relative margin (price minus marginal cost divided by the price) and the   7
structural and competitive conditions of the market. And second, the relative margin 
offers a proxy for the loss of social welfare that is due to the existence of market power. 
The extension of the model to the case of an oligopoly (N banks) provides the 
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         ( 3 )  
which differs from the case of monopoly only in that the elasticities are multiplied by 
the number of competitors (N). With this simple adaptation, the Monti-Klein model can 
be reinterpreted as a model of imperfect competition with two extreme cases: monopoly 
(N=1) and perfect competition (N=infinity).   
Unfortunately, the database used (BANKSCOPE) does not provide sufficiently 
detailed information about the profit and loss account for the calculation of separate 
prices for deposits and loans
2. For that reason, we use a single indicator of banking 
activity in the empirical model of this study and, as in Shaffer (1993), Berg and Kim 
(1994), Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) and Fernández de Guevara et al. 
(2005), banking output is proxied by the total assets of each firm. The starting 
assumption is that the flow of banking goods and services produced by a bank is 
proportional to its total assets. With this approximation, we construct an average price 
that includes interest and non-interest income, and both financial and operating costs are 
computed to estimate marginal costs. 
2.2.  Data 
The data used combine information at national and bank level. In the first case, 
we use information on market structure, regulatory, institutional, macroeconomic, and 
financial development variables. Information on regulation is obtained from the Barth et 
                                                 
2 In the case of loans, the profit and loss account does not give the financial income associated with these 
separately; it appears jointly with other financial products (fixed income investments, for example). In the 
case of deposits, the financial costs are included with those of other liability products.  
   8
al. (2001) database and from the Heritage Foundation. Institutional variables are 
obtained from Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (2002), the Heritage Foundation and the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) data base of the World Bank. Macroeconomic 
variables come from WDI data base. The data on financial development variables are 
obtained from the World Bank (2001). Market concentration variables have been 
constructed using the BANKSCOPE database provided by Fitch-IBCA. Finally, other 
proxy variables for market structure (state ownership and foreign ownership) are from 
Barth el al. (2001). 
Considering that information on regulation refers to commercial banks over the 
period 1995-99, bank level information also refers only to commercial banks. Our 
sample of commercial banks contains 10,479 annual observations over the period 1995-
99. Data are from reported balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of commercial 
banks. Bank level information is from the BANKSCOPE database provided by Fitch-
IBCA. Banks with missing data needed for estimating the Lerner index and some where 
data errors seemed quite likely were not included, however
3. With these restrictions, the 
unbalanced panel data used covers around 83% of all commercial banking assets for 58 
countries classified in seven geographical areas: the European Union (16 countries, 
including Switzerland), East European countries (7), Africa (9), Asia (12), North 
America (2), South America (9) and Oceania (3). Table 1 shows the number of banks 
and market shares of the sample used. 
2.3.  Results 
The calculation of marginal costs is based on the usual specification of a 
translogarithmic cost function where as a measure of production we use total assets (TA) 




                                                 
3 Banks whose input prices (information needed to estimate marginal costs) lie outside the interval of +/- 
2.5 times the relevant standard deviation were deleted. 
4 The prices of the factors of production are here defined as follows:  Price of labour: Personnel costs / 
total assets. Price of capital: Operating costs (except personnel costs) / fixed assets.  Price of loanable 
funds: Financial Costs / Customer and short term funding.   9
TABLE 1.  Number of banks and market shares (% of total assets of commercial banks in 
























Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Market Share 
(%)
Austria 35 35 31 31 31 163 69.74
Belgium 30 33 35 27 25 150 95.07
Denmark 51 52 50 50 48 251 90.22
Finland 6 5 7 7 7 32 99.89
France 179 176 157 159 152 823 86.99
Germany 190 194 200 189 164 937 94.03
Greece 14 16 15 14 10 69 86.50
Ireland 6 4 5 5 4 24 7.44
Italy 63 67 67 72 70 339 95.68
Luxembourg 94 91 91 89 92 457 91.41
Netherlands 16 20 16 13 14 79 14.54
Portugal 18 20 22 22 18 100 91.22
Spain 59 66 66 62 54 307 98.20
Sweden 7 9 5 6 8 35 97.34
Switzerland 153 156 152 140 137 738 98.58
United Kingdom 29 33 31 31 29 153 24.24
EU 950 977 950 917 863 4,657 88.91
Croatia 17 26 32 27 25 127 93.97
Czech Republic 9 15 17 13 15 69 3.90
Hungary 8 10 11 9 11 49 47.95
Latvia 15 15 17 11 17 75 86.61
Lithuania 3 5 9 8 8 33 87.35
Poland 25 25 28 29 28 135 79.25
Romania 3 4 6 11 17 41 72.12
East Europe 171 192 198 161 178 900 44.62
Botswana 5 5 5 4 4 23 99.72
Ghana 5 7 7 7 8 34 85.10
Israel 11 11 11 10 12 55 95.06
Kenya 0 4 7 16 16 43 7.90
Mauritius 0 0 4 5 5 14 51.91
Nigeria 11 24 33 32 36 136 63.56
Saudi Arabia 6 9 8 9 8 40 85.32
South Africa 12 12 14 13 16 67 92.89
Zambia 1 0 0 5 6 12 32.00
Africa 51 72 89 101 111 424 88.83
Bangladesh 10 14 17 17 21 79 85.40
China 0 0 3 3 4 10 80.81
India 55 52 54 55 55 271 95.41
Japan 129 134 127 126 49 565 82.46
Jordan 6 7 7 7 7 34 97.19
Kuwait 5 6 6 6 6 29 97.82
Malaysia 32 32 30 24 30 148 94.05
Nepal 4 6 6 8 8 32 84.54
Singapore 0 7 11 11 11 40 75.10
Slovenia 8 8 11 10 11 48 63.12
Sri Lanka 8 8 7 7 8 38 94.41
Thailand 13 14 11 10 7 55 83.99
Asia 270 288 290 284 217 1349 83.11
Canada 25 35 35 34 32 161 16.98
United States 389 389 387 371 360 1896 95.62
North America 414 424 422 405 392 2,057 92.65
Australia 19 21 17 18 18 93 93.11
Indonesia 67 66 55 29 33 250 69.20
New Zealand 5 5 6 6 6 28 89.11
Oceanía 91 92 78 53 57 371 89.48
Argentina 5 11 12 50 71 149 66.39
Bolivia 10 13 11 11 9 54 82.70
Brazil 89 102 98 98 91 478 93.31
Chile 21 24 23 21 20 109 85.38
Guatemala 4 0 0 0 0 4 2.29
Jamaica 5 5 5 4 6 25 93.43
Mexico 26 29 25 23 27 130 91.60
Panama 3 18 19 5 6 51 19.79
Peru 16 22 20 20 14 92 97.56
South America 179 224 213 232 244 1,092 90.98
All 2,035 2,177 2,162 2,100 2,005 10,479 82.65  10
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where Ci is the bank's total costs including financial and operating costs.  
The estimation of the costs function is done separately for each geographic area, 
allowing the parameters of the cost function to vary from one area to another to reflect 
different technologies. Fixed effects are also introduced in order to capture the influence 
of variables specific to each firm. A trend variable is included to reflect the effect of 
technical change. As usual, the estimation is made under the imposition of restrictions 
of symmetry and of grade one homogeneity in input prices. 
Table 2 contains the average value for period 1995-99 of price, marginal cost, 
absolute margin (price-marginal cost) and relative margin (Lerner index) for each 
banking sector in the sample and for the geographical areas
5. Focusing on margins, the 
absolute margin (price-marginal cost) presents significant variation among countries. 
Thus, absolute margins are very narrow in almost all the European Union banking 
sectors (around 1%), but are very wide in South America and Eastern Europe 
Regarding market power, there are also important differences among countries. 
The last column of table 2 shows that market power is high (a Lerner index over 30%) 
in Latvia (36%), Ghana (39%), Zambia (36%), Nepal (33%), and Jamaica (31%), while 
it is low (below 10%) in Ireland (7%), Luxembourg (8%), Netherlands (9%) and 
Panama (6%). A comparison between the main economic areas shows that market 
power is higher in the USA (23%) and Japan (20%) than in the European Union (15%).  
                                                 
5 The values corresponding to the geographical areas are weighted averages, using total assets as a 
weighting.   11


































Austria 5.84 4.95 0.89 15.48
Belgium 6.12 5.27 0.86 14.06
Denmark 6.10 5.11 1.00 16.00
Finland 5.86 4.70 1.16 19.80
France 6.81 6.07 0.74 10.89
Germany 6.02 5.11 0.91 14.76
Greece 11.30 9.86 1.44 13.16
Ireland 4.99 4.61 0.38 6.64
Italy 7.95 6.73 1.22 15.92
Luxembourg 7.17 6.66 0.51 7.67
Netherlands 7.29 6.54 0.75 9.15
Portugal 8.15 7.10 1.05 13.53
Spain 7.53 6.35 1.19 16.01
Sweden 6.94 5.52 1.42 20.19
Switzerland 5.06 4.13 0.93 18.69
United Kingdom 6.62 4.97 1.65 25.39
UE 6.57 5.61 0.96 14.83
Croatia 10.00 7.04 2.96 28.59
Czech Republic 10.68 8.43 2.25 21.02
Hungary 15.38 12.75 2.64 17.81
Latvia 12.55 7.75 4.79 36.12
Lithuania 14.17 10.06 4.11 27.90
Poland 14.47 10.31 4.16 28.24
Romania 26.08 19.24 6.84 28.00
East Europe 13.07 9.88 3.19 24.03
Bostwana 13.94 10.11 3.82 27.59
Ghana 22.90 14.05 8.86 38.53
Israel 7.15 6.43 0.73 11.59
Kenya 20.79 17.11 3.68 17.92
Mauritus 10.96 8.57 2.39 22.27
Nigeria 16.40 11.93 4.47 26.64
Saudi Arabia 6.91 5.40 1.51 21.59
South Africa 16.97 14.85 2.12 12.61
Zambia 22.52 14.48 8.04 35.75
Africa 10.60 9.02 1.58 15.52
Bangladesh 6.96 6.56 0.40 4.80
China 5.92 4.28 1.64 27.27
India 10.74 9.05 1.68 15.60
Japan 3.73 3.01 0.72 20.08
Jordan 8.19 6.71 1.48 18.19
Kuwait 7.58 5.89 1.70 22.22
Malaysia 8.02 5.93 2.09 25.98
Nepal 10.51 7.01 3.50 33.48
Singapore 5.63 4.09 1.53 27.22
Slovenia 10.34 8.11 2.23 20.97
Sri Lanka 12.46 9.98 2.48 19.70
Thailand 10.27 9.05 1.23 9.95
Asia 4.18 3.38 0.80 20.01
Canada 7.60 6.71 0.90 12.09
United States 8.72 6.67 2.05 22.99
North of America 8.68 6.67 2.01 22.58
Australia 8.24 5.92 2.32 28.13
Indonesia 17.18 13.36 3.82 21.79
New Zealand 9.24 7.26 1.99 21.72
Oceania 9.54 7.06 2.48 26.55
Argentina 10.81 8.16 2.65 24.63
Bolivia 13.08 11.52 1.56 12.75
Brazil 22.55 18.54 4.01 17.92
Chile 12.18 10.77 1.41 11.59
Guatemala 14.06 12.03 2.03 14.42
Jamaica 19.39 13.31 6.08 30.90
Mexico 25.63 18.83 6.79 27.45
Panama 8.25 7.70 0.55 5.73
Peru 13.64 10.58 3.06 22.02
South America 23.15 17.54 5.61 24.47
All 9.35 10.40 2.40 19.98  12
3.  Explanatory variables of market power 
A standard Monti-Klein model of banking competition shows that the Lerner 
index of market power depends on the number of competitors and the demand elasticity. 
In the same line, this standard model has been extended in other papers with the aim of 
incorporating additional explanatory variables of market power. Thus, Corvosier and 
Gropp (2002) and Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005) show that the Lerner index of 
market power depends on bank-specific variables and the structural characteristics of 
the market (market concentration and the elasticity of demand). Additionally, we use a 
number of regulatory, institutional and macroeconomic variables used in other cross-
country studies (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2004 and Claessen and Laeven, 2004) to explain 
differences in the competitiveness of banking systems. 
In this section we analyse the impact of bank-specific, market structure, 
regulatory, institutional, macro and financial development variables on market power 
across countries. More precisely, the potential explanatory variables of market power 
are as follows (table 3 contains the mean weighted averages of the bank-specific 
variables for the period 1995-99):  
a) Bank-specific variables 
As mentioned before, all bank-specific variables are constructed using 
information from the BANKSCOPE database. Variables vary across banks and years. 
Bank Size is defined as the logarithm of total assets in each year. The variable is 
used as explanatory of market power for two reasons: 1) in case there are 
advantages in average costs associated with the possible existence of economies 
of scale; and 2) to test whether size, per se, confers market power
6. As table 2 
shows, there are important differences in bank size across countries. 
Market share equals the bank’s assets divided by total bank assets in the 
economy. Although for the reason given above the data set is formed only by 
commercial banks, the market share of each bank is defined with respect to total 
bank assets (not only commercial banks).  
                                                 
6 For example, as Kim et al (2005) show, as larger banks tend to be more diversified than smaller ones, 
borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates for this sign of quality.   13
Efficiency is the cost to income ratio (overheads/gross income). We introduce 
efficiency as an explanatory variable of market power to discriminate between 
the traditional structure-conduct-performance paradigm and the efficient 
structure hypothesis. In the first case it is to be expected that concentration will 
affect market power positively and significantly. On the other hand, under the 
efficient structure hypothesis the most efficient banks are supposed to gain 
market share (so they act in more concentrated markets) and are more profitable. 
Therefore, it is efficiency, and not concentration, that determines higher banking 
margins. Following Berger (1995), the way to test these hypotheses is by 
introducing concentration, efficiency and market share as explanatory variables 
of the relative margin.  
Bank Risk is constructed as the standard deviation of ROA over the period 1995-
99
7. Taking into account that banks tend to compensate greater risk with higher 
margins, we expect a positive influence of this variable on relative margin 
(Lerner index). 
Fee income. The effect of specialization on market power is proxied by the 
income structure of each bank. More precisely, the variable equals non-interest 
income divided by total assets. Some argue that the increase of the importance of 
non-interest income in recent years is due to increasing competition in traditional 
banking activity (intermediation between deposits and credits), which obliges 
banks to engage in non-traditional activities (mainly fee income sources). For 
that reason, we anticipate a positive influence of fee income on market power.  
Bank equity is a measure of bank capitalization, and is defined as the ratio of 
bank equity to total assets. If banks with high equity ratios face lower 
bankruptcy costs and, consequently, lower funding costs, a positive influence of 
this variable on relative margins (Lerner index) is expected
8. 
 
                                                 
7 Ideally, the bank risk could be proxied by variables such as problem loans and the provisions for 
insolvencies. Unfortunately, BANKSCOPE database only offers these variables for a very small number 
of banks. 
8 Additionally, this variable can have a positive effect on the relative margin if borrowers are willing to 
pay higher interest rates for this sign of quality (well capitalized banks will less likely face large losses).   14


























Source: BANKSCOPE and own elaboration. 
Country












Austria 5472.8 22.54 60.60 2.90 43.25 4.48
Belgium 20890.6 19.52 69.10 2.82 47.42 3.19
Denmark 3866.9 21.26 59.96 3.51 33.43 6.08
Finland 25811.5 37.60 60.40 4.13 33.11 4.83
France 11048.0 8.99 75.44 4.57 59.19 3.58
Germany 9815.5 12.26 64.97 3.08 57.52 4.17
Greece 5669.2 24.72 67.77 9.27 67.28 5.62
Ireland 2178.6 2.67 34.92 0.38 21.65 8.20
Italy 12002.3 6.81 68.51 4.99 50.76 6.12
Luxembourg 4411.9 3.43 40.62 2.97 36.33 3.31
Netherlands 2970.3 3.61 54.97 5.92 30.74 6.02
Portugal 6796.3 9.68 65.77 5.32 51.61 5.61
Spain 7788.2 12.13 70.13 4.43 41.10 5.43
Sweden 29200.9 28.72 56.95 5.05 46.42 3.86
Switzerland 6103.5 32.54 72.91 5.12 86.23 4.89
United Kingdom 12942.9 18.93 65.87 7.95 34.41 4.57
EU 10930.8 15.00 67.39 4.28 54.66 4.39
Croatia 341.1 17.28 65.55 10.80 189.28 11.95
Czech Republic 3652.7 15.56 56.05 6.82 74.94 7.12
Hungary 1528.5 14.57 68.92 8.90 134.00 6.40
Latvia 126.6 11.48 65.56 20.77 221.36 11.30
Lithuania 210.0 21.45 73.14 18.01 208.64 9.85
Poland 1394.4 7.85 48.95 7.78 113.47 11.04
Romania 622.3 34.58 37.27 14.52 283.09 12.58
East Europe 2222.2 13.85 55.76 8.32 114.56 8.92
Bostwana 287.6 28.90 54.06 14.61 83.99 9.03
Ghana 153.4 24.37 45.67 26.67 268.67 11.41
Israel 9716.2 22.89 68.22 5.90 27.50 6.49
Kenya 42.9 0.99 57.68 3.74 98.06 12.20
Mauritus 633.0 28.20 39.65 3.56 66.79 15.19
Nigeria 407.8 6.25 64.87 23.60 143.41 9.05
Saudi Arabia 10566.6 14.33 57.84 4.59 32.78 9.98
South Africa 6933.0 20.26 65.16 11.39 113.73 5.52
Zambia 70.1 14.32 58.25 18.49 216.54 11.78
Africa 8607.7 19.08 63.91 7.99 61.48 7.35
Bangladesh 637.6 17.10 86.88 7.11 93.15 3.54
China 26322.6 5.90 35.66 0.48 71.02 5.42
India 3363.9 9.17 62.85 6.77 50.18 4.76
Japan 59323.6 4.65 55.50 1.47 15.26 3.86
Jordan 3029.5 56.28 53.88 5.48 62.30 7.10
Kuwait 5626.6 23.20 36.41 3.87 41.90 10.52
Malaysia 3917.8 8.46 39.53 3.68 53.85 7.96
Nepal 87.7 20.68 38.12 9.00 62.92 7.18
Singapore 12925.3 20.16 34.01 1.37 45.30 11.22
Slovenia 619.4 12.57 62.29 8.97 78.21 10.74
Sri Lanka 628.5 29.53 59.18 10.67 79.03 7.44
Thailand 12596.7 12.67 80.57 4.51 136.62 7.17
Asia 54745.5 5.46 55.42 1.73 20.28 4.17
Canada 4253.7 3.71 69.25 5.02 35.80 5.32
United States 9205.4 2.66 63.28 10.61 60.47 7.77
North America 9018.4 2.70 63.50 10.40 59.54 7.68
Australia 20262.0 14.87 61.06 7.74 39.86 7.38
Indonesia 1330.1 6.36 54.06 5.07 208.35 7.60
New Zealand 10302.3 20.35 68.09 6.09 25.91 4.11
Oceanía 16602.5 14.37 60.94 7.20 60.62 7.03
Argentina 2.3 8.38 71.00 13.31 121.31 10.19
Bolivia 1.8 11.87 55.71 4.24 81.09 7.39
Brazil 4.6 8.01 76.27 19.01 309.85 9.55
Chile 1.1 9.78 61.85 3.58 57.64 8.13
Guatemala 0.8 4.42 76.59 1.01 71.55 8.52
Jamaica 19.2 39.16 68.49 9.48 177.01 8.35
Mexico 38.5 13.57 70.40 7.44 201.81 7.17
Panama 0.3 2.66 40.56 1.58 47.79 7.16
Peru 2.9 15.41 71.38 11.41 143.58 8.59
South America 25.1 13.35 71.49 10.76 219.24 8.02
All 14593.2 11.97 62.63 7.24 84.34 6.80  15
b) Market structure variables 
Table 4 contains the mean of the national level variables classified in four 
groups: market structure, institutional, macroeconomic, and financial development 
variables. For the first group, three variables of market structure are used: 
Bank concentration is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirshman index (HHI). For 
each country and year, concentration is computed using bank-level data from the 
BANKSCOPE database. Taking into account that concentration is a 
characteristic of the market, the HHI is computed as the sum of the squares of 
the market shares of all banks (commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative 
banks, etc) existing in a country. To check the robustness of the results, 
alternatively we use the CR3 and CR5 variables (market share of the three or 
five largest banks in the country). As table 3 shows, concentration varies 
considerably among banking sectors. HHI ranges from a low value in the USA 
(1.03) and Germany (1.88) to a high value in some African banking sectors 
(68.41 in Zambia; 65.04 in Botswana). 
State ownership equals the share of banking system assets that are in state-
owned banks, that is, banks that are 50% or more government owned (Source: 
Barth et al., 2001). In the sample, India (80%), Romania (70%), and Bangladesh 
(70%) have banking systems where state-owned banks account for more than 
70% of the market. 
Foreign ownership measures the degree of foreign ownership, approximated by 
the fraction of the banking system’s assets that is in banks that are 50% or more 
foreign owned (Source: Barth et al., 2001). In New Zealand (99%), Botswana 
(98%), Jordan (68%) and Zambia (64%), the market share of banks foreign 
owned is higher than 60%.  
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TABLE  4.  Market structure, regulatory, institutional, macro and financial development 
variables 
 
Source: See text. 
 HHI 
(%)


























Austria 7.69 21.36 0.04 0.05 0.07 5 4.60 4.8 1.37 3.90 30.49
Belgium 10.65 25.15 0.00 9 4.00 4.75 0.9 3.90 28.47
Denmark 10.18 28.62 0.00 0.08 8 4.00 5 1.58 3.86 35.97
Finland 25.09 39.62 0.22 0.08 0.00 7 3.00 4.5 1.62 3.78 27.78
France 3.96 15.53 0.00 6 3.00 3.8 1.02 3.65 27.77
Germany 1.88 8.91 0.42 0.04 0.00 5 4.00 4.8 1.37 3.80 30.79
Greece 15.51 46.82 0.13 0.05 0.00 9 2.00 3.8 0.63 3.12 11.90
Ireland 8.58 35.94 0.00 8 4.00 4.8 1.4 3.98 21.72
Italy 3.22 13.80 0.17 0.05 0.26 10 3.33 3.8 0.91 3.54 19.70
Luxembourg 2.91 11.65 0.05 0.95 0.00 6 4.00 4.75 1.46 4.05 48.28
Netherlands 12.46 39.19 0.06 0.00 6 5.00 4.75 1.64 4.00 28.54
Portugal 7.22 27.05 0.21 0.12 0.00 9 3.00 4 1.2 3.51 11.64
Spain 4.68 16.61 0.00 0.11 0.00 7 3.50 3.8 1.11 3.48 15.78
Sweden 9.59 31.68 0.00 0.02 0.07 9 3.33 4 1.53 3.49 28.39
Switzerland 15.02 32.10 0.15 0.09 0.00 5 4.50 5 1.72 4.06 44.45
United Kingdom 3.62 17.98 0.00 5 5.00 4.8 1.5 4.13 20.58
EU 8.89 25.79 0.11 0.16 0.03 7.13 3.77 4.45 1.31 3.77 27.02
Croatia 14.10 32.66 0.37 0.07 7 3.00 2 0.03 2.39 4.63
Czech Republic 13.12 34.87 0.19 0.26 0.36 8 5.00 4 0.68 3.77 5.19
Hungary 24.61 43.35 0.03 0.62 0.33 9 3.75 4 0.87 3.01 4.70
Latvia 17.69 41.66 0.00 0.00 8 3.75 3.25 0.26 3.10 2.22
Lithuania 26.46 57.75 0.44 0.48 0.50 9 2.80 3 0.26 2.85 2.06
Poland 14.36 35.12 0.44 0.26 0.00 10 3.00 3.6 0.7 2.96 3.22
Romania 31.81 56.28 0.70 0.08 0.35 13 3.00 2.4 -0.08 2.55 1.53
East Europe 20.31 42.67 0.31 0.30 0.26 9.14 3.47 3.18 0.39 2.95 3.36
Botswana 65.04 70.59 0.02 0.98 0.33 10 3.67 3.8 0.56 2.95 3.42
Ghana 29.41 44.97 0.38 0.54 0.78 12 3.00 3.2 -0.14 2.72 0.39
Israel 16.89 48.81 13 3.00 4 0.68 3.17 16.30
Kenya 12.05 32.93 0.85 10 3.33 3 -0.78 2.78 0.34
Mauritius 22.22 60.99 0.00 0.26 13 4.00 4 0.69 3.35 3.72
Nigeria 27.21 42.65 0.13 0.00 0.00 9 2.33 3.2 -1 2.73 0.25
Saudi Arabia 19.32 47.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 11 3.00 4.25 -0.24 3.20 6.86
South Africa 11.70 31.51 0.00 0.05 0.26 8 3.00 3.2 0.11 3.08 3.94
Zambia 68.41 56.49 0.23 0.64 0.00 13 4.00 3.2 -0.2 3.07 0.39
Africa 30.25 49.87 0.11 0.35 0.32 11.00 3.26 3.54 -0.04 3.01 3.96
Bangladesh 12.73 36.47 0.70 0.64 0.79 12 2.80 2 -0.39 2.43 0.34
China 15.11 46.04 0.25 14 3.00 2.2 -0.2 2.44 0.68
India 6.29 22.06 0.80 0.00 0.47 10 2.00 2.8 0 2.19 0.42
Japan 2.85 12.68 0.01 0.06 0.00 13 3.33 4.8 0.95 3.99 43.47
Jordan 33.64 60.43 0.00 0.68 11 4.00 3.8 0.33 3.08 1.60
Kuwait 11.93 32.73 0.00 10 3.00 4.5 0.34 3.48 14.94
Malaysia 6.16 22.45 0.00 0.18 10 3.00 3.8 0.51 3.38 4.54
Nepal 28.20 61.79 0.20 0.35 0.21 8 2.00 2.75 -0.29 2.53 0.23
Singapore 13.21 30.46 0.00 0.50 8 4.00 4.8 1.44 4.54 25.14
Slovenia 12.98 44.71 0.40 0.05 0.00 9 4.00 3.5 0.85 2.29 10.23
Sri Lanka 18.78 60.37 0.55 7 4.00 3.4 -0.38 3.26 0.81
Thailand 7.84 24.29 0.31 0.07 1.00 9 3.00 4.2 0.15 3.66 2.84
 Asia 14.14 36.88 0.27 0.28 0.39 10.08 3.18 3.55 0.28 3.11 8.77
Canada 11.49 34.13 0.00 0.13 7 4.00 4.8 1.43 3.89 20.73
United States 1.03 5.59 0.00 0.05 0.00 12 4.00 4.8 1.29 4.16 29.27
North America 6.26 19.86 0.00 0.05 0.06 9.50 4.00 4.80 1.36 4.03 25.00
Australia 9.08 26.13 0.00 0.17 0.00 8 5.00 4.8 1.41 21.91
Indonesia 16.89 24.79 0.44 0.07 0.60 14 3.00 3 -0.76 2.97 1.06
New Zealand 14.90 54.06 0.00 0.99 0.00 4 5.00 4.75 1.59 4.21 17.00
 Oceania 13.62 34.99 0.15 0.41 0.20 8.67 4.33 4.18 0.75 3.59 13.32
Argentina 6.53 24.98 0.30 0.49 0.00 7 3.75 4 0.33 3.54 7.99
Bolivia 11.74 36.27 0.00 0.42 0.00 12 3.50 3.6 0.02 3.23 0.94
Brazil 9.56 30.84 0.52 0.17 0.74 10 3.00 3 0 2.59 4.49
Chile 15.41 41.69 0.12 0.32 11 3.00 4.6 0.87 3.68 5.00
Guatemala 9.84 25.17 0.08 0.05 0.30 13 3.33 3 -0.5 3.21 1.50
Jamaica 23.67 56.82 0.56 0.44 12 4.00 3.6 -0.03 3.24 2.21
Mexico 9.24 34.27 0.25 0.20 12 2.00 3 -0.07 2.86 3.40
Panama 61.17 53.46 0.12 0.38 0.06 8 5.00 3.2 0.11 3.56 3.58
Peru 16.96 46.80 0.03 0.40 0.00 8 4.00 3.4 -0.18 3.10 2.30
South America 18.23 38.69 0.22 0.32 0.18 10.33 3.51 3.49 0.06 3.22 3.49
All 15.96 35.54 0.17 0.27 0.21 9.41 3.65 3.88 0.59 3.38 12.13
Country
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c) Regulatory variables 
Fraction of entry denied is the fraction of entry applications denied (both 
domestic and foreign). In the banking sectors of the European Union and North 
America, the fraction of entry denied is very low (0.03 in the EU and 0.06 in 
North America). On the contrary, in Asia and Africa, some banking sectors deny 
more than 50% of the entry applications. This variable is obtained from the 
Barth et al. (2001) database. 
Activity restrictions are a measure of the degree to which national authorities 
allow banks to engage in activities that generate non-interest income (securities, 
insurance, real state, and bank ownership of nonfinancial firms). The measure 
varies from 4 to 16, where higher values indicate greater restrictions. India (14), 
Indonesia (14), Romania (13), Jordan (13), Guatemala (13) present the highest 
values in this measure, while New Zealand (4) presents the lowest one. This 
variable is from the Barth et al (2001) database. 
Banking freedom is an indicator that provides an overall measure of openness of 
the banking sector and the extent to which banks are free to operate their 
businesses. It ranges from 1 to 5. Higher values signify more freedom. The 
indicator is calculated as 6 minus the banking freedom index of the Heritage 
Foundation. It is expected that market power is lower as banking freedom is 
higher. Banking freedom is high in Netherlands, UK, Australia, New Zealand, 
and Panama. On the opposite side, Greece, Nigeria, Nepal, and Mexico present 
the lowest levels of the banking freedom indicator (Source: Economic Freedom 
Index of the Heritage Foundation) 
 
d) Institutional variables 
Property rights are an indicator of the protection of private property rights. The 
indicator ranges from 1 to 5, higher values indicating better protection of 
property rights. It is calculated as 6 minus the property freedom index of the 
Heritage Foundation. In general, countries of the European Union, North 
America and Oceania extensively protect property rights, while Croatia and 
Bangladesh present the lowest values of the indicator (Source: Economic 
Freedom Index of the Heritage Foundation).   18
KKZ institution index is an aggregate indicator of the quality of institutional 
development in the country. The index is calculated using information on six 
issues: voice accountability, political stability, government’s effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Source: Kaufman et 
al., 2002). In the European Union and North America the KKZ index is very 
high, while in East Europe and Asia (except Singapore and Japan) the quality of 
institutional development is low. 
Economic freedom is an overall indicator of economic freedom that captures the 
degree individuals and firms feel free to conduct their business. This variable 
comes from the Economic Freedom Index of the Heritage Foundation. The 
indicator ranges from 1 to 5. UK, Switzerland, Singapore, USA, and New 
Zealand are at the top of the ranking, India and Slovenia at the bottom.  
GDPpc is the real per capita GDP. It is used as an overall indicator of 
institutional development. It comes from the World Development Indicators data 
base of the World Bank. 
 
e) Macro variables 
Inflation is the annual growth rate of the CPI index. Huybens et al. (1999) show 
that inflation artificially increases banking margins. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) 
also show that theory suggests that inflation influences interest margins. These 
authors show that the effect of inflation on interest margins is positive, although 
the impact is not economically huge. (Source: World Development Indicators of 
the World Bank). 
GDP growth is the annual rate of growth of GDP. The variable is introduced to 
capture the possible effect of the business cycle. (Source: World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank). 
 
Financial development variables 
These variables are obtained from World Bank (2001). Following Dermirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (2001), we use indicators of bank and stock market size and activity. 
More precisely, the variables used are the following:   19
Bank is the banking assets/GDP ratio, and measures the size of the banking 
sector. In general, as table 4 shows, richer countries have larger banking sectors. 
Market capitalization is constructed as stock market capitalization divided by 
GDP. This variable provides a measure of the size of the capital markets in the 
country and permits to investigate the impact of the degree of competition banks 
face from non-bank financial institutions. 
Bank Credit is constructed as the ratio of credit to the private sector/GDP. This 
variable reflects the activity of the banking sector.   
Total value traded is defined as the quotient between the value of the trading of 
domestic exchanges and GDP. This value is used as an indicator of the 
efficiency or liquidity/activity of the stock markets. The liquidity is very high in 
Switzerland, Malaysia, and USA, while it is very low in African stock markets. 
4.  Explaining market power differences in banking: empirical 
results 
To analyse the effect of bank-specific, regulatory, institutional, macro and 
financial development variables on market power, regressions are estimated using a 
random-effects model. The advantage of using the random effects panel estimator is that 
it allows us to estimate the effect of variables which are constant across banks (in a 
given country) and over time (as is the case for the regulatory and institutional 
variables)
9. The use of random effects panel estimators is also indicated when the 
explanatory variables are subject to measurement error. 
4.1.  The effect of bank-specific and market structure variables 
Table 5 presents regressions of the Lerner index on bank-specific variables and 
market structure variables. Depending on data availability for the market structure 
variables, the number of observations varies from 8,431 to 10,288.  
                                                 
9 The same approach is used by Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2002). 
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Column (1) reports results using the Herfindahl-Hirshman index (HHI) as proxy 
for bank concentration. Bank size affects the Lerner index positively, which indicates 
that large banks tend to have more market power. However, market share does not have 
a statistically significant influence on market power, indicating that what is relevant for 
explaining differences in market power is not the market share, but the size. Fee income 
has a positive impact on market power, which indicates that banks more specialized in 
fee-based activities tend to have higher relative margins. This is consistent with the 
view that competition is higher in the traditional task of intermediation (taking deposits 
and granting loans) than in other banking activities (such as off-balance-sheet activities 
that generate non-interest income). Highly capitalized banks have higher market power, 
which may reflect the fact that such banks pay less for deposits as depositors consider 
these banks to be more secure. Bank risk has a positive and statistically significant 
influence on market power, which indicates that more risky banks have to compensate 
their higher probability of default with higher margins. Finally, bank concentration 
(HHI) has a positive impact on market power. 
Columns (2) and (3) check the robustness of results using CR3 and CR5, 
respectively, as proxy variables for bank concentration. Both CR3 and CR5 have a 
statistically significant influence on market power but with a negative sign, which 
shows the importance of measuring market concentration adequately
10. From a 
theoretical point of view, the HHI is superior, as absolute market concentration 
measures (e.g. CR3 or CR5) only take into consideration the market share of the largest 
banks. For this reason, the HHI variable is used in the rest of the study. 
Column (4) additionally introduces two indicators of market structure: the 
importance of the foreign presence in the ownership of banks (foreign ownership) and 
the degree of government involvement in the banking sector (state ownership) In the 
first case, results show that market power decreases as the degree of foreign ownership 
of banks increases. This result is consistent with the research that suggests that foreign-
owned banks generate more competition in the national markets (see Martinez Peria and 
Mody, 2004 and Claessens and Laeven, 2004). In the second case, the state ownership 
variable enters with a negative sign. 
                                                 
10Claessen and Laeven (2004) report a positive relationship between CR5 and the degree of competition, 
suggesting that bank concentration may not be a good summary statistic for banks’ competitive 
environment.    21
In terms of economic magnitude, the greatest impacts are those of size and of 
efficiency. Thus if the size of a bank increases by 10%, its market power increases by 
3.3%. In the case of efficiency, an improvement of 10% in the cost to income ratio 
translates into an increase of 2.4 pp. in the Lerner index, representing an increase of 
11.2% in the bank’s market power. In the case of market share, fee income, bank equity 
and risk, the economic magnitude is much smaller (less than 1% of variation in the 
Lerner index if these variables increase 10%). In the case of concentration, its economic 
significance is very small as an increase of 10% in the HHI translates into an increase of 
0.3% in the Lerner index. Finally, if the foreign ownership variable increases by 10%, 
market power decreases by 1%. 
TABLE 5.  Regression results using bank-specific and market structure variables 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the Lerner index of market power. All country-level variables are averages for the period 
1995-99. 
We use GLS with random effects. Between parentheses, standard errors.*,**,*** indicate significance level of 10,5 
and 1 per cent, respectively.   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank Size 0.0137 *** 0.0120 *** 0.0119 *** 0.0108 ***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Market share -0.0001  0.0005 0.0005 0.0009 ***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Fee income 0.0103 *** 0.0104 *** 0.01036 *** 0.0093 ***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Efficiency -0.0037 *** -0.0037 *** -0.0037 *** -0.0036 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Bank Equity 0.0008 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0003 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Bank Risk 0.0052 *** 0.0051 *** 0.0051 *** 0.0057 ***
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012)






State ownership -0.0918 ***
(0.0089)
Foreign ownership -0.1296 ***
(0.0079)
Constant 0.2703 *** 0.2912 *** 0.2927 *** 0.3339 ***
(0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0072)
R2 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.6
Nobs. 10,288 10,288 10,288 8,431  22
4.2.  Bank-specific, market structure and regulatory variables 
Table 6 shows results introducing additionally the effect of regulatory variables 
(fraction of entry denied, activity restrictions and banking freedom) on market power. 
The results in column (1) show that in countries that refuse a higher proportion of bank 
entry applications, market power is higher. This result indicates that the barriers to entry 
protect existing banks against foreign competitors, allowing them to enjoy higher 
relative margins.   
If activity restrictions is used as a proxy for regulatory restrictions (column 2), 
results show that market power is higher in countries that restrict banks from engaging 
in non-traditional activities (securities underwriting, real state, owning non-financial 
firms, and insurance). This is consistent with the results of Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2004) 
who suggest that restrictions on bank activities are associated with higher margins. 
Claessens and Laeven (2004) also find that cross-country variations in bank competition 
can be explained by differences in lack of activity restrictions, with fewer restrictions 
enhancing competition. 
Finally, banking freedom also presents a negative and statistically significant 
impact on market power, which indicates that market power is low in countries where 
banks are free to operate their businesses. 
The economic size of the determinants of market power is very unequal. Thus, 
while a growth of 10% in the efficiency of a bank (fall in the cost to income ratio) 
translates into an increase of 2.3 pp. in its market power, an increase of 10% in any 
other variable translates into a variation of the Lerner index of less than 1 pp. In the case 
of regulatory variables, the greatest economic impact corresponds to the activity 
restrictions variable (if this variable increases by 10%, market power increases 3.5%) 
followed by banking freedom (a 10% increase translates into a loss of market power of 
2.2%)
11.  
To summarise, as in Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004), the results show the 
importance of bank regulation in explaining differences in bank margins (in our case, 
                                                 
11 As banking freedom provides an overall index of bank freedom (which captures the effect of different 
regulatory variables), in the rest of the study we report the results using this variable as a proxy for the 
impediments to competition.   23
relative margins) among countries, the economic impact of activity restrictions being 
similar to the economic impact of size. 
TABLE 6.  Regression results using bank-specific, market structure and regulatory variables 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the Lerner index of market power. All country-level variables are averages for the period 
1995-99. 
We use GLS with random effects. Between parentheses, standard errors.*,**,*** indicate significance level of 10,5 
and 1 per cent, respectively.   
 
4.3.  Bank-specific, market structure, regulatory and macro variables 
With the aim of analysing the additional effect of macroeconomic variables, 
table 7 shows the results incorporating inflation and GDP growth as explanatory 
variables of market power.  
 
   
(1) (2) (3)
Bank Size 0.0094 *** 0.0109 *** 0.0109 ***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Market share 0.0010 ** 0.0007 *** 0.0007 ***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Fee income 0.0087 *** 0.0098 *** 0.0094 ***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Efficiency -0.0039 *** -0.0036 *** -0.0036 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Bank Equity 0.0003 ** 0.0005 *** 0.0004 ***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Bank Risk 0.0058 *** 0.0032 *** 0.0052 ***
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012)
HHI 0.0010 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0010 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
State ownership -0.0896 *** -0.0719 *** -0.1086 ***
(0.0099) (0.0087) (0.0096)
Foreign ownership -0.1347 *** -0.1048 *** -0.1262 ***
(0.0080) (0.0078) (0.0079)
Fraction of entry denied 0.0360 ***
(0.0107)
Activity restrictions 0.0084 ***
(0.0006)
Banking freedom -0.0127 ***
(0.0029)
C 0.3663 *** 0.2474 *** 0.3822 ***
(0.0078) (0.0093) (0.0131)
R2 0.61 0.62 0.60
Nobs. 7,626 8,431 8,431  24
TABLE 7.  Regression results using bank-specific, market structure, regulatory and macro 
variables 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the Lerner index of market power. All country-level 
variables are averages for the period 1995-99. 
We use GLS with random effects. Between parentheses, standard errors.*,**,*** 
indicate significance level of 10,5 and 1 per cent, respectively.   
 
Inflation has a positive influence on market power, indicating that relative 
margins are higher in countries with higher inflation rates. If in addition we introduce 
the effect of economic growth (column 2), the results indicate that market power 
depends also on the business cycle. Results also indicate that inflation retains the 
positive relationship with market power once economic growth is introduced into the 
regression. 
(1) (2)
Bank Size 0.0109 *** 0.0107 ***
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Market share 0.0007 *** 0.0007 ***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Fee income 0.0094 *** 0.0094 ***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Efficiency -0.0036 *** -0.0036 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Bank Equity 0.0003 *** 0.0003 ***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Bank Risk 0.0047 *** 0.0049 ***
(0.0012) (0.0012)
HHI 0.0010 *** 0.0010 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
State ownership -0.1144 *** -0.1103 ***
(0.0098) (0.0099)
Foreign ownership -0.1262 *** -0.1390 ***
(0.0079) (0.0089)
Banking freedom -0.0109 *** -0.0073 ***
(0.0030) (0.0032)
Inflation 0.0198 *** 0.0237 ***
(0.0069) (0.0070)
GDP growth 0.0041 ***
(0.0014)
Constant 0.3561 *** 0.3283 ***
(0.0159) (0.0183)
R2 0.60 0.60
Nobs. 8,431 8,431  25
Although the macroeconomic variables are statistically significant, the economic 
significance is very low, especially in the case of GDP growth. In particular, if the 
inflation rate increases by 10%, the Lerner index increases by 0.3 pp, while a 10% 
increase in GDP growth translates into an increase of 0.1 pp. In other words, if inflation 
rate and GDP growth increase 10%, market power only increases 1.2% and 0.6%, 
respectively. 
It is also noteworthy that the rest of the explanatory variables of market power 
maintain their sign and magnitude after incorporation of the macroeconomic variables, 
the economic impact of efficiency and size again being outstandingly high. 
4.4.  Bank-specific, market structure, regulatory, macro and institutional 
variables 
Following the strategy of incorporating additional potential explanatory 
variables of market power, table 8 shows results incorporating institutional impediments 
to banking competition. The first column reports results using per capita GDP as a 
proxy for institutional development. The effect of this variable is negative and 
statistically significant, suggesting that richer countries enjoy lower levels of market 
power. If we use an aggregate index of the level of institutional development (KKZ 
index), column (2) shows that countries where the  institutional environment is more 
“stable” and guarantees a better protection of persons and properties, banking 
competition is more intensive. Results also suggest (column 3) that in countries with 
greater protection of private property rights, banks achieve lower levels of market 
power. 
In terms of economic magnitude, the effect of institutional variables is low, 
compared to the effect of bank-specific variables. Thus, a 10% increase in the per capita 
GDP implies a 0.6% reduction in market power. Although the effect of economic 
freedom is greater (1.8%), this effect is not statistically significant.   26
 
TABLE 8.  Regression results using bank-specific, market structure, regulatory, macro, and 
institutional variables 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the Lerner index of market power. All country-level variables are averages for the period 1995-99. 
We use GLS with random effects. Between parentheses, standard errors.*,**,*** indicate significance level of 10,5 and 1 per 
cent, respectively.   
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank Size 0.0117 *** 0.0122 *** 0.0103 *** 0.0109 ***
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Market share 0.0004 0.0005 ** 0.0008 *** 0.0007 ***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Fee income 0.0095 *** 0.0096 *** 0.0094 *** 0.0095 ***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Efficiency -0.0036 *** -0.0036 *** -0.0036 *** -0.0036 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Bank Equity 0.0004 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0003 *** 0.0003 ***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Bank Risk 0.0046 *** 0.0041 *** 0.0050 *** 0.0047 ***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
HHI 0.0009 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0009 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
State ownership -0.1156 *** -0.1146 *** -0.1000 *** -0.1146 ***
(0.0100) (0.0098) (0.0124) (0.0105)
Foreign ownership -0.1305 *** -0.1423 *** -0.1379 *** -0.1389 ***
(0.0093) (0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0089)
Banking freedom -0.0026 0.0117 ** -0.0133 *** -0.0045
(0.0035) (0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0039)
Inflation 0.0189 ** 0.0157 *** 0.0242 *** 0.0217 ***
(0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0072)
GDP growth 0.0027 ** 0.0054 *** 0.0040 *** 0.0039 ***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
GDP per capita -0.0006 ***
(0.0002)






Constant 0.3276 *** 0.2829 *** 0.312296 *** 0.3413 ***
(0.0182) (0.0192) (0.0247) (0.0213)
R2 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.60
Nobs. 8,431 8,431 8,431 8,431  27
4.5.  Bank-specific, market structure, regulatory, macro, institutional and 
financial development variables 
Finally, in table 9 we examine the impact of the all potential explanatory 
variables of banking competition, including the effect of bank-specific, market 
structure, regulatory, institutional and, additionally, financial development variables. 
Regarding the financial development, the negative (and statistically significant) 
effect of the activity (credit/GDP) and development/size (bank/GDP) of the banking 
markets suggest that in well-developed banking markets competition is higher. In the 
case of the stock markets, both market capitalization/GDP and total value traded/GDP 
have a positive and significant effect, which suggests that well-developed stock markets 
allow banks to achieve higher relative margins
12. A possible explanation is that in this 
situation, banks can specialize in non-interest income activities, which allow banks to 
enjoy higher levels of market power. In terms of economic magnitude, the influence of 
the financial development of banking markets is very important: a 10% increase of the 
credit/GDP ratio (bank/GDP) is associated with a 2.32% (1.42%) decrease in market 
power. 
Table 10 shows the percentage variation of the Lerner index in response to a 
10% increase in its determinants (evaluated at average sample values). As the results 
indicate, the main explanatory factors of market power in banking are efficiency and 
size, larger and more efficient banks achieving higher relative margins. Macroeconomic 
variables have a very small economic impact (but statistically non significant), the 
presence of foreign capital being relatively important in encouraging banking 
competition. Financial development (both of the stock market and, to a greater extent, 




                                                 
12 Using bank-level data for a large number countries over the 1990-97 period, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2001) show also that banks in well-developed banking market face tougher competition, and 
therefore lower margins and profitability. They also show that banks have greater profit opportunities in 
well-developed stock markets.    28
 
TABLE  9.  Regression results using bank-specific, market structure, regulatory, macro, 






































Note: Dependent variable is the Lerner index of market power. All country-level 
variables are averages for the period 1995-99. 
We use GLS with random effects. Between parentheses, standard errors.*,**,*** indicate 
significance level of 10,5 and 1 per cent, respectively.   
 
(1) (2)
Bank Size 0,0108 *** 0,0117 ***
(0,0009) (0,0008)
Market share 0,0009 *** 0,0006 ***
(0,0003) (0,0003)
Fee income 0,0081 *** 0,0082 ***
(0,0003) (0,0000)
Efficiency -0,0038 *** -0,0036 ***
(0,0000) (0,0000)
Bank Equity 0,0002 0,0003
(0,0002) (0,0002)
Bank Risk 0,0033 *** 0,0035 ***
(0,0012) (0,0012)




State ownership -0,0871 *** -0,0902 ***
(0,0100) (0,0101)
Foreign owners -0,1184 *** -0,1423 ***
(0,0095) (0,0094)
Banking freedo 0,0009 0,0009
(0,0035) (0,0034)
GDP growth -0,0037 -0,0024
(0,0001) (0,0015)








Market capitalization/GDP 0,0218 ***
(0,0022)
Constant 0,3937 *** 0,3553 ***
(0,0181) (0,0180)
R2 0,62 0,61
Nobs. 8130 8133  29
TABLE 10.  Economic significance of the market power determinants 
    
Note: The data in the table indicate the percentage variation of the Lerner index in response to a 10% 





5.  Conclusions 
The measurement of the degree of competition in any economic sector is of great 
relevance in that the level of social welfare decreases as the monopoly power of firms 
increases. In the specific case of the banking sector, the analysis of the social 
inefficiency associated with market power is even more important if we take into 
account the importance of the financial intermediation function in economic growth. 
Thus, the greater the market power of financial intermediaries the higher will be the cost 
of financial intermediation and, in consequence, the lower economic growth. 
(1) (2)
Bank Size 3,31 3,58
Market share 0,09 0,06
Fee income 0,72 0,72
Efficiency -11,77 -11,15
Bank Equity 0,09 0,14
Bank Risk 0,13 0,13
HHI 0,21 0,18
Inflation 0,05 0,38
State ownership -0,73 -0,75
Foreign ownership -0,92 -1,10
Banking freedom 0,15 0,16
GDP growth -0,53 -0,35
GDP per capita 0,27 -0,68
Credit/GDP -2,19
Total value traded/GDP 0,59
Bank/GDP -1,32
Market capitalization/GDP 0,76  30
From the point of view of economic policy, it is as important to measure the 
degree of competition in banking markets as to analyse the determinants of market 
power. Only when such factors have been clearly identified will it be possible to 
instrument suitable measures to reduce the market power of banks. 
In this context, this paper presents empirical evidence of the impact on market 
power (proxied by the Lerner index) of bank-specific, market structure, regulatory, 
institutional, macro and financial development variables, using bank level data across 
58 countries over the period 1995-99. In summary, the main findings are the following. 
First, from the point of view of the magnitude of the economic impacts, bank-
specific variables are the most important for explaining the differences in market power 
among banks. Nevertheless, although the influence of the totality of bank-specific 
variables is statistically significant, there are substantial differences of economic 
significance among these variables, particularly the high magnitude of the effect of bank 
size and, above all, efficiency. More precisely, a 10% increase in bank size or 
efficiency, would translate into an increase of 3.5% and 11.1%, respectively, of market 
power. 
Second, market structure variables are also seen to be significant in the 
explanation of differences in market power. Thus an increase in bank market 
concentration positively affects market power, competition being lower in the countries 
with less foreign presence among bank shareholders and with lower proportion of state 
owned banks.  In the case of bank concentration, the economic significance is low, 
showing the limitations of using concentration measures as indicators of competition. 
Also, the results differ depending on the indicator of concentration used (Herfindahl 
index or CR(n)), which constitutes additional evidence of the limitations of bank 
concentration as indicator of competition. 
Third, bank regulations help to explain some of the differences observed in the 
market power of banks. Thus, market power is greater in countries with a high 
proportion of entry applications refused, where banks face regulatory restrictions on 
their activities (in securities, insurance, etc.), and with a low level of banking freedom. 
However, the effect of regulation is not significant when controlling for financial 
development variables. Likewise, macroeconomic conditions are not seen to be relevant 
in the explanation of the differences in market power when controlling for financial 
development variables.   31
Fourth, the empirical evidence suggests that banks have higher market power in 
countries with underdeveloped banking markets. On the other hand, market power is 
higher in countries with developed stock markets.  
Fifth, from a policy maker point of view, results suggest that competition policy 
in the banking sector should not be based exclusively on the market concentration as 
bank concentration is not a good summary statistic for bank competitive environment. 
Results are in line with the contestability literature which shows that concentration does 
not necessarily capture the degree of effective competition.   32
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